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Abstract We are seldom taught that simplification has a high risk of 
failure. In truth, it only works up to a point, after which all that lies ahead 
is failure. To examine the limits of simplicity is to look at what happens 
when our efforts to make things fit into a sound bite, label, or keyword go 
awry. When simplification works, it can indeed be very effective. But sim-
plification does not always work—so more is not necessarily better. And 
when simplification fails, it fails miserably. This article exposes the limita-
tions of simplification as a design choice, explores the cognitive origins of 
why we often get led astray in making such a design choice, and explores 
how we might develop a set of practical heuristics to counter the seduc-
tiveness of simplicity itself. The goal is appropriateness and balance—what 
cybernetics calls requisite variety, and what many design practitioners call 
placing context in context. The article concludes with a heuristic to guide 
the practitioner on what to do when their efforts at simplification are 
failing. 
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Introduction—the Error of Simplicity
Ambiguity is ever-present in our world, but all too often we choose to ignore it. 
We assert the simple in lieu of the complex; the direct in lieu of the nuanced or 
the subtle; the label or category in lieu of recognizing the portfolio of choices that 
label/category represents. This article will argue that how we choose to deal with 
ambiguity is itself a design choice. Often, the response to ambiguity is to simplify. 
Yet many times simplification is inappropriate—it leads to outcomes that are poorly 
suited to the situation at hand. It is a pattern we cannot seem to break. Yet we 
do not go through life overwhelmed by the apparent complexity continually con-
fronting them—instead, we make choices about what to handle, what to perceive, 
and which questions to ask. We often choose to assert the simple over the com-
plex. We then act based on the simplifications we have chosen, regardless of their 
appropriateness.
“Finally, we are learning that simplicity equals sanity.” 1  
“Much of our human mental life looks to involve a seamless unfolding of per-
ception, action and experience: a golden braid in which each element twines 
intimately with the rest.” 2  
“In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying 
to understand the mechanism of a closed watch…. He will never be able to 
compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the 
possibility or the meaning of such a comparison.” 3  
“The business of a philosopher is primarily to make clear what is happening in 
thinking.” 4 
Thinking frames are designs. We create them for a purpose, and they can be eval-
uated accordingly. An emphasis on simplification is a rather poor design choice, 
as it blocks rather than encourages dialogue and learning. Chimamanda Ngozi 
Adichie’s presentation “The Danger of Single Story” has become one of the 20 most 
viewed TED talks since the platform’s inception. 5  In it, she warns of the dangers of 
over-simplification—by focusing on simplifying, we are forced to use blinders, and 
that which we do not see may be that which is most important.
When we perceive the world as coherent—as holding together and making 
sense—we have the ability to assume our situation, and get on with things. The 
nuanced complexity of the world in which we operate can threaten that notion of 
coherence. When our perception of coherence is shattered, we continually have to 
ask questions, and we worry about our inability to find answers we can believe in. 
We react to that loss of assurance with a loss of self-confidence—we revert back to 
whatever coherence we can find. At that moment, our first instinct is to simplify.
We make sense of the world through explanation. Retrospective explanation 
is used as the basis for prediction, and upon such prediction we act. But “we are 
ruined by our own biases. When making decisions, we see what we want, ignore 
probabilities, and minimize risks that uproot our hopes.” 6  Our minds dislike ambi-
guity and doubt. Instead, we have an ingrained desire to construct coherent narra-
tives, which leads us to seek confirming evidence, while disregarding information 
that refutes our prior view—an inclination known as confirmation bias. What results 
is a confidence in our understanding which may be greater than the circumstances 
warrant, and a further confidence in the simplifications we have chosen—on which 
we then base our actions. That excess confidence is a problem. It can block our 
solving a problem—or even our perceiving one—and it can block our access to the 
1 John Maeda, The Laws of 
Simplicity: Design, Technology, 
Business, Life (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2006), eBook, front 
matter.
2 Andy Clark, “Perception, 
Action, and Experience: Unravel-
ing the Golden Braid,” Neuropsy-
chologia 47, no. 6 (2009): 1460. 
3 Albert Einstein and Leopold 
Infeld, The Evolution of Physics: 
The Growth of Ideas from Early 
Concepts to Relativity and 
Quanta (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1938), 31.
4 Richard Bevan Braithwaite, 
Scientific Explanation: A Study 
of the Function of Theory, 
Probability and Law in Science, 
vol. 515 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1953), 368. 
5 Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, 
“The Danger of a Single Story,” 
TEDGlobal (video), July 2009, 
accessed June 18, 2016, https://
www.ted.com/talks/chimaman-
da_adichie_the_danger_of_a_
single_story?language=en.
6 From Daniel Kahneman, 
Thinking Fast and Slow (New 
York: Macmillan, 2011), as 
quoted in Dennis Berman, “So 
What’s Your Algorithm?” Wall 
Street Journal, January 4, 2012, 
accessed June 18, 2016, http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014
240529702034623045771389613
42097348.
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innovative next thing. Our failure to recognize that there is a trade-off between 
relying on simplifications and our ability to exploit the many opportunities that a 
given context provides means that all too often we accept satisficing when some-
thing better lies just around the corner.
What Is Wrong with Simplicity?
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” 7  “The goal … 
is to make the wonderful and the complex understandable and simple, but not less 
wonderful.” 8  “If the result is only partially rewarding this can be wholly blamed 
upon … the complexity of the real world.” 9 
The choice of simple models can be many a person’s undoing. When too much 
simplicity is opted for, Simon’s “wonderful” can be woefully compromised. Models 
based on labels, descriptions, and categories we shall refer to as representations. 
More nuanced models involving stories, multiple algorithms, rules of thumb, ques-
tions, and ambiguity we shall refer to as compressions. Compressions capture nuance 
and context in a manner that representations cannot. A person’s use of a simple 
representation can thus mask much of what might be important regarding both 
coping with the given context and the changes that may be required to cope with 
the next and future contexts. The “wonderful” is in the context—not in the restric-
tions placed upon it. 
The result is that simplifications are useful only up to a point, and then their 
utility takes a precarious turn downwards. When the demands for meaning require 
more content and/or context than the existing (simple) representation offers, it 
becomes difficult for other people to process a simple representation in the same 
manner as its speaker does. The simple representation loses appropriateness—it is 
not what the situation requires—and its ability to be effective diminishes. If one 
attempts too much simplification, the resulting representation can be trapped in a 
chasm of dissonance as shown by the red arrow in figure 1. In summary, when com-
pressions are appropriate to a given situation—when nuance, subtlety, and context 
matter—the aggressive use of a simple representation often leads to disagreements 
and dissonance amongst your audience. That dissonance, in turn, creates a hostile 
environment for effectiveness (see figure 1).
Simplicity can be seen in the tendency people have to assert labels—represen-
tations—instead of defining models—compressions—and to identify best practices—
representations—rather than explore affordances 10  or the adjacent possibilities of 
their context. 11  The mistake is one of attributing cause to category when identity 
is undetermined, uncertain, and undefined—which instead suggests a need to 
identify mechanism, and exposes the reality that the representation is likely to 
7 This statement is popularly 
attributed to Albert Einstein.
8 Herbert A. Simon, The 
Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 
1996), x. 
9 J.D. Sargan, “The Danger of 
Over-Simplification,” Bulletin of 
the Oxford University Institute of 
Economics & Statistics 19, no. 2 
(1957): 178.
10 James J. Gibson, “The Theory 
of Affordances,” in Perceiving, 
Acting and Knowing: Toward an 
Ecological Psychology, ed. R. 
Shaw and J. Bransford (Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum, 1977); James J. 
Gibson, The Ecological Approach 
to Visual Perception (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1979); Joanna 
McGrenere and Wayne Ho, 
“Affordances: Clarifying and 
Evolving a Concept,” in Graphics 
Interface Proceedings, vol. 2000 
(Montreal: Interaction Design 
Foundation, 2000), 179–86.
11 Stuart A. Kauffman, Investiga-
tions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002).
Figure 1 Limits to Simplifica-
tion. Image © 2016 by Michael 
Lissack.
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be inadequate. Only if one has well-earned confidence in one’s descriptors does it 
make sense to use them to analyze a situation. 
Metaphors and analogies may be fascinating and tantalizing, but they are very 
uncertain and questionable. If we want to model a situation, we need to be sure of 
the definitions, identities, and terms we make use of. And if we wish to assert that 
a representation holds true for a given situation, we must attempt to match the 
context of the representation to the situation actually at hand. No such epistemic 
care is normal in everyday life. Labels are all too quickly assumed to be accurate 
depictions of reality.
When simplicity isn’t obvious—when it doesn’t just present itself to us—we 
create it. Sometimes, if not most of the time, the simplicity we deal with is actually 
our own construction—a product of our own heads. We see the world. We process 
the world. But the way we process it is to tell a story that makes sense of what it is 
we think we see, of what it is we think we need to deal with. And, most of the time, 
we tell a simple story. We say the world is X, or Y, or Z—these are our labels.
To express that the world is “X,” we filter the reality that we see. How? First, 
we limit our field of attention. We narrow the context of whatever we are dealing 
with. Then, we limit the factors to be considered. We assert a set of boundaries and 
constraints. Then we predict likely outcomes, given the boundaries and constraints 
that we have just imposed. In effect, at this point, we have actually constructed 
multiple realities in our heads. Finally, we pick amongst those multiple realities. By 
choosing from amongst our predictions, we have taken the complex, complicated 
reality that we first encountered and turned it into a simple construct. That con-
struct becomes the story we tell—the narrative that we use to explain the situation 
to others and to ourselves. This process is illustrated in figure 2.
In creating that construct we are making choices, and those choices need to be 
explicitly recognized. We can choose to recognize and deal with the multiplicities 
of meaning that ambiguity evokes, or we can choose to deny those same elements. 
We can choose to incorporate a degree of ambiguity if we deliberately give room 
for the observer/actor/participant to include some of their own meaning in a given 
situation. By opting for the combination of ambiguity plus a label, we create the 
equivalent of a Black Box (figure 3)—a hidden mechanism into which a variety of 
meanings can be ascribed and then used as explanations. 
This Black Box is not the one found on an airplane—which collects as much 
data as possible. Instead, it is a set of words, a sign, or a description that we use 
to simplify how we talk about some bigger thing. We use Black Boxes because we 
can use them like shorthand, instead of having to spell out the details of a bigger 
thing. Quite often we use Black Boxes because they allow us to take a shortcut—by 
Figure 2 The process of reality 
filtering. Image © 2016 by 
Michael Lissack.
Figure 3 A Black Box. Image © 
2016 by Michael Lissack.
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referring to the Black Box we can avoid having to actually learn the details of that 
bigger thing. 
Models—both representations and compressions—can be thought of as 
shortcuts and abstractions. Rosenblueth and Wiener 12  argued that the key to un-
derstanding lay in abstraction. Deutsch opens with: “Men think in terms of mod-
els.” 13  Hutten continues: “The model prescribes a context … used to provide an 
interpretation of new phenomenon.” 14  Though the provisionality and contingency 
of all models is well known, popular culture persists in utilizing the special case of 
representations as if they were more than they are. In effect, category attributions 
are given a power they do not deserve. If we need a way of reducing the world 
enough that we can cope with it and act in it, then the use of labels helps people 
to have an actionable view of the world. In everyday life, words and phrases often 
emerge from concrete situations in which participants jointly work out ways of de-
scribing what is going on. New terms, symbols, or images are situated—they acquire 
meaning through collective use in real situations. 15  Labels play a very valuable role 
in limiting complexity. Instead of discussing the multiplicity embodied by compres-
sions, the simplicity of a crude model and a few labels—in the form of representa-
tions—is often preferred.
Another way to say this is that models are partial truths—they partially reflect 
some aspects of reality. Good models have well-defined relationships to reality so 
that we know how and when to use them. This means that we recognize which 
aspects of the model are related to which aspects of reality. This is not piece-by-
piece correspondence, but behavior-by-behavior correspondence. Our use of models 
is clearly not only a property of the model, but also a property of our (incomplete) 
understanding of the relationship between the model and reality. To the extent 
that people base their actions on labels, without a continual cross check with 
reality, coherence is threatened. To the extent that people encourage dialogue 
about that cross check, coherence can be enhanced. Such a dialogue demands the 
recognition that compressions are not their labels, that ascribed substitutions can 
be threatening, and that Black Boxes are just that—a device for increasing degrees 
of freedom and reducing fragility—in other words, an explicit recognition of 
ambiguity.
Usually, people’s representations take the form of rule-based checklists and 
of Deming-inspired statistical controls, both of which assume that the labels and 
underlying models have permanent validity. A stasis to the world is assumed but 
seldom exists. Such a stasis assumes that opportunities for action are predictable, 
context is controllable, and emergence is non-existent. Yet the world of practicing 
people does not match these oversimplifications. Prediction, at best, is only pos-
sible in the short term. Boundaries are always shifting. Identities are unclear. As 
Heisenberg told us: “The world is not divided into different groups of objects but 
rather into different groups of relationships…. The world thus appears as a compli-
cated tissue of events, in which connections of different kinds alternate or overlap 
or combine and thereby determine the texture of the whole.” 16  The trade-off be-
tween outcome and process does not favor one over the other. In the world we live 
in, emergence is pervasive, context is seldom controllable, ecologies are emergent, 
and few affordances are predictable. Situation and context play key roles. In the 
complex world of organization, continuity is but a fragile, temporary, and illu-
sionary notion—the assumption of predictability does not hold.
By making assumptions—and in so doing, restricting ourselves to a set of 
labels and a model—we predetermine what might be learned, which will limit the 
options that appear to be open to us. This is because by adopting a particular per-
spective—and therefore making assumptions consistent with that perspective—we 
limit what we can see. “We often fail to allow for the possibility that evidence that 
12 Arturo Rosenblueth and 
Norbert Wiener, “The Role of 
Models in Science,” Philosophy 
of Science 12, no. 4 (1945): 
316–21.
13 Karl W. Deutsch, “Mecha-
nism, Organism, and Society: 
Some Models in Natural and 
Social Science,” Philosophy of 
Science 18, no. 3 (1951): 230.
14 Ernest Hirschlaff Hutten, 
“The Role of Models in Physics,” 
The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 4, no. 16 
(1954): 295.
15 D. C. Gooding and T. R. Addis, 
“Modelling Experiments as 
Mediating Models,” Foundations 
of Science 13, no. 1 (2008): 17–35.
16 Werner Heisenberg, Physics 
and Philosophy: The Revolution in 
Modern Science (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1959), 107.
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should be critical to our judgment is missing. What we see is all there is.” 17  The 
perspective acts as a lens that only allows particular features to come into focus—
all other features are lost, or assumed to be irrelevant. Furthermore, in communi-
cating with others, by making use of a particular viewpoint, we limit our and their 
ability to see what is relevant. The problem with ascribing a label, and using it as 
our method of explanation, is that once we have ascribed it—“this belongs to Label 
X”—then that explanation is done. The assertion is that the representation holds. 
Implicitly, it is further asserted that the complexity and degrees of freedom found 
in compressions are unnecessary. “I am a ‘nice’ person. Nice people do X. I must do 
X.” There is no room in this equation for context. The representation is assumed to 
govern. 
In our use of representations, we have a tendency to demand coherence—a 
unity, or oneness—between the situation, people, process, et cetera to which we are 
applying the representation, and our understanding of the meaning of the repre-
sentation itself. 18  When we observe a mismatch between our understanding of the 
representation and the target of our use, we seek to demand a correction—other-
wise we risk suffering cognitive dissonance. This notion of a mismatch is critical to 
understanding what is wrong with our emphasis on simplicity.
An exemplar of this kind of mismatch can be found in the New York City 
police raid on the Fook On Sing Funeral Supplies store in August, 2011. 19  Fook On 
Sing Funeral Supplies is a well-known Chinatown establishment where members 
of the Chinese community go to acquire expertly crafted paper replicas of items 
which where symbolically important to their recently departed. The paper replicas 
are burned on a funeral pyre—at no time would they be used as if they were a sub-
stitute for the real item. Yet on that fine August day, Wing Sun Mak, the proprietor 
of Fook On Sing Funeral Supplies, was arrested for selling counterfeit Louis Vuitton 
handbags. Paper counterfeits. To be burned at the cremation of the dead. Because 
they were, after all, counterfeits. Yes, the label—the representation—fit. But the 
compression, the story, and its context did not. Ascriptive coherence—how well a 
situation matches a label—suggested that the paper handbags were contraband. 
Experienced coherence—how well the elements perceived are attuned to the situation 
at hand—told a very different story. The police did not have a sufficient level of 
ambiguity built into their understanding of the label ‘counterfeit.’ The representa-
tion lacked sufficient degrees of freedom to account for the nuance of the actual 
situation—and so it failed to serve as an adequate guide to reality.
It is critical to realize that many situations demand some ambiguity—a little 
wiggle room. When there is a mismatch between the degrees of freedom required 
to account for a given situation’s nuance, and the degrees of freedom provided by 
a given representation, there is a tendency for error to occur. That which should 
not be viewed rigidly will be so viewed, or vice versa. In cybernetics there is a law 
regarding this need for balance—just enough ambiguity and degrees of freedom, 
not too much, not too little—called the “law of requisite variety.” 20  Failure to pay 
attention to this law can mean that either a system is unable to be controlled or 
guided—usually when the system has more degrees of freedom or ambiguity than 
its supposed controller—or, that attractive possibilities will get overlooked because 
they happen to fall outside of a definition drawn too narrowly.
People make this kind of error far more often than the police. When the focus 
is on efficiency, in order to assure coherence, we create lists and provide codes that 
keep us tied to the ascribed meanings. 21  We sanitize out the ambiguous and the 
unexpected. We look for confirming evidence, and eliminate outliers as so much 
noise. Indeed, there are times when efficiency and strict adherence to codes and 
checklists are absolutely essential—for example, we want the products we order to 
arrive on time with excellent quality. We want our computers to operate without 
17 Kahneman, Thinking Fast and 
Slow, 87.
18 That demand for coherence 
is the focus of the much of the 
literature on the subject. For 
example, see Paul Thagard, 
Conceptual Revolutions (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 
1992); Paul Thagard, Coherence 
in Thought and Action (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); 
and Hugo Letiche, Michael 
Lissack, and Ron Schultz, 
Coherence in the Midst of 
Complexity: Advances in Social 
Complexity Theory (Basingstoke, 
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
19 Jeffrey E. Singer and Corey 
Kilgannon, “Yes, He Sold Fakes. 
They Are Supposed to Be Fake,” 
New York Times, August 24, 2011, 
accessed June 18, 2016, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/
nyregion/chinatown-funer-
al-goods-bring-copyright-in-
fringement-arrest.html?_r=0.  
20 W. Ross Ashby, “Requisite 
Variety and Its Implications 
for the Control of Complex 
Systems,” Cybernetica 1 (1958): 
83–99.
21 “Codes” here means a word 
or label that can be mapped on 
a one-to-one basis to a specific 
meaning, usually via what is 
called a “look-up table.”
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the need for error messages, and our baggage to arrive at the same airport and time 
as we do. If efficient codes have produced a positive experience before, we may 
want the next experience to be just like the previous one. Measured coherence, and 
the establishment of procedure to enforce it, is integral to how much of our world 
operates. That efficiency is, however, the epitome of Taleb’s 22  notion of fragile, and 
the opposite of the lessons to be gleaned from hermeneutics.
“Hermeneutics holds the promise of fundamentally altering the way one 
thinks about interpretation, understanding, and the communication of cul-
ture… interpretation must be a matter of constant revision: revising one’s 
sense of the whole as one grasps the individual parts, and revising one’s sense 
of the parts as the meaning of the whole emerges.” 23 
Wing Sun Mak’s counterfeits satisfied all of the definitions contained in the label 
‘counterfeit,’ while their use and intent satisfied none. The police model of what 
constitutes a counterfeit was vastly different from that understood by those who 
purchase Chinese funeral objects. Yet the explanatory form of a label can be sup-
planted by the situated reality of a good story, or a better compression.
Computers rely on efficiency’s form of coherence. To a computer, coherence is 
the degree to which an item matches a definition, or matches a set of items having 
observable qualities that match one another. Computer coherence is about mea-
surement. Coherence of this kind is not created—it is assigned, ascribed, and mea-
sured. This is the coherence of efficiency—ascriptive coherence. Coherence grounded 
in efficiency has no room to consider context, history, and situation. Efficient co-
herence demands a context of stability. The (more complex) experienced coherence, on 
the other hand, entails a process of finding stability in context. Without reliance on 
the former, efficiencies are difficult to create and exploit. Without an awareness of 
the latter, life passes us by and crises descend seemingly from nowhere. Miracles 
happen when context, history, and situation combine in a fortuitous way—nasty 
surprises occur when context history and situation combine in an unfortunate way. 
In this case, the predictions based on efficiency’s coherence did not pan out. The 
Fook On Sing Funeral Supplies raid made the New York police look foolish.
Risks in Our Preference for the Simple
Simplification is a form of reality creation. We each have cognitive limits, and 
cannot process all the information that is present in the world around us. We have 
to pick and choose what to pay attention to, what to allocate energy and effort to, 
and what to ultimately deal with. We call the result of these choices ‘reality,’ but 
that reality is only a subset of the swirl of items, information, people, and environ-
ments around us. We make choices so that we can cope (see figure 4).
As Richard Rorty told us: “Knowledge is not a matter of getting reality right 
… but rather a matter of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality.” 24  How 
we cope is critical to our retaining the ability to act. Simplification is one powerful 
form of coping. Yet it has great potential for leading us astray.
We have to make assumptions; it is unavoidable. Nonetheless, it is important 
to appreciate the significance of doing so. When people learn to rely on labels and 
simplistic interpretations, they also learn to discount stories and emotions, which 
are not so easily described in term of rationality and linearity. When people find 
that the world is best dealt with through compartmentalization or reductionism, 
they tend to think that it is OK to deny the reality of interrelationships or the mul-
tiplicity of interpretations that exist whenever that situatedness is acknowledged. 
When people learn that abstract quantitative models contain ‘truth,’ they are being 
22 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The 
Black Swan (New York: Penguin 
Random House Trade, 2007).
23 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On 
the Circle of Understanding,” in 
Hermeneutics versus Science, ed. 
John M. Connolly and Thomas 
Keutner (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 
1988) as quoted in Paul Kidder, 
Gadamer for Architects (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 3.
24 Richard Rorty, Objectivity, 
Relativism, and Truth: Philosoph-
ical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 1. 
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taught that truth does not include individuality, weak signals, embodiment, or 
context. People can find solace in simplistic models that promise protection from 
unpredictability and an excuse to not have to think.
Politicians take advantage of this solace preference when they speak in sim-
plistic ways about their plans for the future. Brands take advantage of this pref-
erence when showing us idealistic pictures of ‘how things could be’ if only we 
made use of brand x or y or z. Both politicians and brand managers are themselves 
making another simplification—none of us, voters or consumers, are individuals. 
Instead, we are representatives of some market segment. We each represent one 
member of an undifferentiated mass that gets a label and then is managed as if the 
label were all that mattered. Retail used to mean catering to an individual. In the 
present age, it means catering to representatives of labeled, homogenous segments. 
Supposedly, labels vote and labels buy. Or at least that is the simplification used 
daily by the brands and the pols.
Labels and categories eliminate individual variations of specific items. The 
substitution of a label for a thing itself thus simplifies the world. Labels form a very 
valuable role in limiting the world. Instead of actively discussing the multiple ap-
proaches that may all be interpretations, enactments, or embodiments of a model, 
people often act as if there is but one or perhaps two interpretations. These ‘privi-
leged’ interpretations are given status as names, labels, or symbols—and the labels 
are then used as guides for action.
People deal with the surfeit of information, complexity, and anxiety in their 
worlds by compartmentalizing and modeling: “If we can model it, we can manage 
it.” The very existence of the model is taken to mean that the model is appropriate 
for application. Do what the model says—complexity will be reduced, and anxiety 
lessened. It is often blindly assumed that the models are correct, and that they 
somehow capture what is important for decision making. In other words, we can 
apparently accept a model’s reifications without concern.
“Why models? Because the inanimate world is filled with quasi-regularities 
that hint at deeper causes. We need models to explain what we see and to predict 
what will occur. We use models for envisioning the future and influencing it.” 25  If 
one wants to ‘model’ a situation, one needs to be sure of the definitions, identities, 
and terms of use one is making use of. Again, if one wishes to assert that a repre-
sentation holds true for a given situation, one must attempt to match the context 
of the representation to the situation actually at hand. Derman continues: “Theo-
ries and models are a kind of magic, and the builders of successful ones, are sha-
mans bridging the visible and invisible worlds.” 26 
Static descriptions are not true models. They do not provide any opportunity 
for us to simulate potential changes—we cannot ask “What-If?” and What-Ifs are 
25 Emanuel Derman, Models. 
Behaving. Badly.: Why Confusing 
Illusion with Reality Can Lead 
to Disaster, on Wall Street and 
in Life (New York: Free Press, 
2011), 43.
26 Derman, Models, 43.
Figure 4 Our own reality. Image 
© 2016 by Michael Lissack.
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essential before committing to action. The flow chart for a true model is shown in 
figure 5. True models allow What-Ifs to be simulated, and include a means for any 
selected What-If to be implemented. By allowing ourselves to conflate the meanings 
of the words ‘description’ and ‘model,’ we have lost the distinction that makes the 
difference—only true models help you plan or simulate potential interventions. 
Descriptions cannot. True models explicitly describe how such interventions are 
possible. More importantly, true models allow us to experiment by simulating what 
might happen in the representation before we actually attempt to intervene in the 
system itself.
The experiments we run or simulate are shown in the triangles to the right. 
As we run experiments we simulate the What-If, and we see what happens under 
various scenarios. This is shown by the feedback arrow. We then pick one of 
the courses of action from our experiments and we attempt to implement it. If 
our model is a good model, then the intervention in the system will behave in a 
manner predicted by the experiment in the model. The better the match between 
what the model predicts and what actual interventions produce, the better the 
model.
With a true model, we can run the mental experiment many times before we 
choose to act. A description offers no such luxury. Intervention points may be iden-
tified in a static description, but they cannot be acted upon without engagement 
in the system itself. True models allow us to test casual explanations. Descriptions 
only allow for theories of cause to be asserted. When a description is offered as 
an explanation, its success is almost completely dependent upon the idea that the 
future will mirror the static past captured within the description itself.
Explanations are the basis of the decisions and actions that follow them. When 
people enact the environment, Weick claims, “they construct, rearrange, single out, 
and demolish many ‘objective’ features of their surroundings. They unrandomize 
variables, insert vestiges of orderliness, and literally create their own constraints.” 27  
In other words, they attempt to reduce the world to their model and labels. In so 
doing, they are making design choices that fail to reflect their own nuanced envi-
ronment and instead demand coherence to a simpler exogenous model. Sometimes 
this approach works. Often, it does not. But note—both success and failure are 
rather clear-cut when they occur. The design choice for simplicity seldom leaves 
room for a middle ground.
Here is where the risk of using the wrong kind of explanation manifests itself 
as poor decisions and inappropriate actions. The language we each use to describe 
our surroundings predetermines what we see. As Kuhn put it: “You don’t see some-
thing until you have the right metaphor [model] to let you perceive it.” 28  Or as 
suggested by Srivastva and Barrett, 29  naming implies anticipations, expectations, 
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Figure 5 A true model. Image 
© 2016 by Michael Lissack.
The Oft-Overlooked Dangers of Simplification 
38 she ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation      Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016
and evaluations toward the named. By making assumptions—and in so doing re-
stricting ourselves to a particular or one method of interpretation—we predeter-
mine what might be learnt, which will limit the options that appear to be open to 
us as people. Indeed, one typical strategy for dealing with the complexity around 
us is to attempt to categorize what we encounter, and draw boundaries around 
what we are willing to deal with. The rest we ignore. The act of boundary setting, 
like the act of categorizing, is one of brute force. Items, events, people, contexts, 
interactions are either ‘in’ or ‘out.’ At best, there are degrees of being in or out. Bu-
reaucratic and industrial activity depends on boundaries and routines to exist. They 
are label-driven—their efficiency requires boundary-setting. Often the boundaries 
are defined in models used to determine which label is to be placed onto which 
situation.
It is rare that we all agree on an identical set of labels, and adopt the same 
model. Often, two or more stories emerge to describe a situation, as shown in 
figure 6. We learn to co-interpret and jointly share circumstances. Stories we have 
heard and explanations that we have received make circumstances recognizable 
and sensible. People, politicians, healthcare professionals, teachers, and so on may 
like to assume that what their audiences hear is what they think they are com-
municating, but their labels often can be experienced every which way. Many like 
to treat their labels as if context and situation did not exist, and the labels were 
mono-interpretable. Thus, the nub of the personal problem—to choose a label is to 
limit one’s possibility space or degrees of freedom, choices and boundaries, and it 
imposes a set of constraints. If the limitation works in the present environment—if 
it leads to the desired results—then all is well for the moment. By imposing limita-
tions, we risk compromising our potential. In effect we are treating the world as a 
metaphor, but as a metaphor for what?
“Metaphors do not exist as words in memory, but as networks of abstract 
understandings that constitute part of our mental imagery.” 30  These networks 
of abstract understandings are inherently ambiguous. They function like a Black 
Box with multiple degrees of freedom. The fusion of memory, metaphor, and 
story enables the creation of meaning around, or personal relevance in, a specific 
affordance or set of affordances. Affordances are the joint property of an actor, that 
actor’s at-the-moment cognition, the environment, and a purpose. When we desire 
to sit, and we see a surface that our cognitive history allows us to perceive as pro-
viding the opportunity to be sat upon, then to us at that moment the surface affords 
the opportunity for sitting. If the surface was composed of potato chip bags, and 
we had an awareness of our own weight, we might question the existence of the 
30 Gerald Zaltman, How Cus-
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‘sitting’ affordance—a question we would not have regarding a wooden surface, 
but might have regarding a bed of nails. Affordances have a special relationship to 
metaphors, in that metaphors are the principal means by which we recognize an 
opportunity as an affordance for something. When we are exposed to metaphors, 
stories, and memories, we don’t passively absorb such messages. Instead, we create 
their meaning by mixing information from the context with our own memories, 
other stimuli present at the moment, and the metaphors that come to mind as we 
think about the affordance being attended to. 31  
The policemen who made the Fook On Sing arrest made no use of their ability 
to re-interpret the situation to fit the context. Instead, they accepted the literal 
rules told to them—without metaphorical thinking, and without any attempt to 
create their own meaning. As the NY Times article noted, “yes they sold fakes … that 
was the whole idea.” 32 
The risks we face in relying on simplicity are not limited to the idea that our 
explanations are wrong. So too may be the actions/decisions based upon them, 
which also includes the possibility that in our reliance upon a fragile simple model 
lacking in degrees of freedom, we will be unable to perceive or attend to adjacent 
possibles 33  and useful affordances. This latter risk speaks directly to our ability to 
cope with change, prosper with emergence, and innovate.
Assigning Meaning is Itself a Design Choice
The choice of how to declare and assign meaning is one each of us makes nearly 
all the time. In making these choices, we are, in effect, designing the reality with 
which we cope. We tend to be oblivious of the process we use in making those 
choices. Husserl 34  referred to that obliviousness as the basis for what he called the 
fundierung relation—that which underlies the possibility for an action, yet is taken 
for granted and not spoken of. The classic example is that when one is writing with 
a pen, one’s attention is on the content being written and/or on the act of writing, 
and is NOT on the mechanisms of the pen that allow the writing to occur. 35  Our 
assertions of simplicity are often made without regard to the implications of this 
fundierung relation. Making simple representations means we can bracket away am-
biguity and remove it from the immediate discussion. We know that doing so has 
been very successful in many contexts, and that it is much easier to make data-like 
claims about the simple, and that making use of the simple allows us to assert 
direct causality. 
When we cite a metaphor, we focus on the apparent similarities. In doing so, 
we seemingly forget that the assertion of the metaphor also creates a parallel but 
overlooked focus on differences. This forgetting parallels the fundierung of sim-
plicity—which is to state that we are indeed making a choice to ignore nuance, 
context, prior habitus, affordances, emergence, and adjacent possibles. Picking 
simplicity as a representation is a choice even if we often forget to treat it as such.
The consequences of this choice can be seen in the following series of quotes:
• “We take up only those actions and solutions that have an immediate effect 
on the situation, and always as they have been framed for us.” 36 
• “We, therefore, fail to note important items in plain sight, while we misread 
other facts by forcing them into preset mental channels, even when we 
retain a buried memory of actual events.” 37  
• “Interpretations can be considered as ‘having made sense’ out of a situation. 
Having made sense out of it means that ambiguities have been removed, 
and so action is possible. By contrast, when there is a lack of sense making, 
when multiple interpretations are flourishing, ambiguity prevails and action 
avoidance is the normal result.” 38  
31 For example, see Zaltman, 
How Customers Think.
32 Singer and Kilgannon, “Yes, 
He Sold Fakes.”
33 Kauffman’s term for those 
possibilities which lie very near 
our present state. John Brock-
mann, “The Adjacent Possible: 
A Talk With Stuart Kaufmann,” 
edge.org, last modified Septem-
ber 9, 2003, https://www.edge.
org/conversation/stuart_a_kauff-
man-the-adjacent-possible.
34 Edmund Husserl, Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenol-
ogy and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy—First Book: General 
Introduction to a Pure Phenom-
enology, trans. F. Kersten (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1982). 
35 For example, see Gian-Carlo 
Rota, “Fundierung as a Logical 
Concept,” The Monist 72, no. 1 
(1989): 70–77. 
36 Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, 
Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes 
of Reason Rule Our Minds, trans. 
Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini and 
Keith Botsford (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1994), 58.
37 Stephen Jay Gould and 
David Halberstam, Triumph and 
Tragedy in Mudville: A Lifelong 
Passion for Baseball (New York: 
WW Norton, 2004), 223.
38 Michael Lissack and Johan 
Roos, The Next Common Sense: 
Mastering Corporate Complexity 
Through Coherence (London: 
Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 
1999), 54.
The Oft-Overlooked Dangers of Simplification 
40 she ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation      Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2016
• “All cultures have ways of dealing with these anomalies and ambiguities. 
One way to deal with ambiguity is to classify a phenomenon into one cate-
gory only and maintain it within the category, thus reducing the potential 
for uncertainty. Another method of dealing with anomaly is to physically 
control it, removing it. A third way is to avoid anomalous things by strength-
ening and affirming the classification system that renders them anomalous. 
Alternatively, anomalous events or things may be labeled dangerous.” 39  
• “The object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of reality—
this would be an utterly impossible task—but rather to provide us with an 
instrument for finding our way about more easily in this world.” 40  
• “The only meaningful thing is the usefulness of the model…. When such a 
model is successful at explaining events, we tend to attribute to it, and to 
the elements and concepts that constitute it, the quality of reality or abso-
lute truth.” 41  
In the first quotation, Piattelli-Palmarini and Gould focus on the immediacy of what 
we choose to process, while Lissack and Roos highlight the importance of making 
sense as establishing the boundary which encloses that processing in the second. 
What we choose to see will affect what we then pay attention to, which then affects 
the processes we call upon to make sense out of those attended to items. As Lupton 
points out in the third passage, we then need to “clean up” the attended to data 
and its resulting story—remove the anomalies and ambiguities, and leave behind 
a “simple story.” When this succeeds, it is “as if” our simple story was the very 
reality we need to deal with, as Hawking and Mlodinow describe in the final quota-
tion. But, we must remember the lessons from Vaihinger, in the fourth quotation, 
and Rota 42 —our simple story is the result of choice we make and have made. We 
always have the option of making different choices—but the reality we deal with 
will be the one we choose to deal with.
The key to such choices is appropriateness. So just what does this seemingly 
all-powerful word appropriate actually mean in this context? It turns out that appro-
priately gets defined by how well the Black Box or story you are using meets three 
tests: 
1) Do you have a model or merely a description? This tells you whether you 
have given the listener an opportunity for action in your narrative. 
2) Are you generating resonance? This tells you whether your Black Box or 
story matches both the context and the understanding of the listeners. 
3) Is the story, Black Box or label complex enough? Or perhaps too complex? 
Getting the balance right is critical.
While simple representations are constrained by pre-established meanings, cues, 
affordances, and similar, compressions are free of such constraints. Affordances 
suggest that meaning is contained inside us. As Maeda 43  puts it, “What lies in the 
periphery of simplicity is definitely not peripheral.” When we encounter a signal, 
the signal evokes a meaning based on what’s going on in our—the receivers’—
heads, and is not based on what the transmitter of the signal intended. We refer to 
these signals as cues. The inability to define the environment in which a signal will 
be interpreted, and the parallel inability to predict affordances, are what render 
cues complex and their study part of qualitative complexity. Cues are thus the 
label for the emergent meaning which results from an intersection of attendance 
to environment, situation, history, and cognition, such that semiotic affordances 
are perceived to allow for 1) action, 2) assignment of cognition, label, or code, or 
3) boundary breaking. Compressions are cued while representations are mapped. 
Cues tap into experience while codes tap into ascription. Cues are situated and 
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contextual. Simple representations are ascriptive and conform to pre-established 
judgments. Taleb 44  refers to this cycle as the reification of a “narrative fallacy,” 
which describes how humans are biologically inclined to turn complex realities 
into soothing but oversimplified stories. Black Boxes used in a successful story 
work because both their inputs and outputs are cues—cues that openly declare 
their ambiguity to context, and thereby allow the listener to imbue the Black Box 
with their own meaning.
Stories Can Be Our Salvation
Stories provide a broader framework that enables us to understand the generalities, 
or looseness, of ideas. Stories can be embedded in a new context, and the nuggets 
of knowledge contained in these stories can be applied to a new range of settings. 
As Orr 45  puts it: “The key element is the situated production of understanding 
through narration, in that the integration of the various facts of the situation is ac-
complished through a verbal consideration of those facts with a primary criterion 
of coherence. They do not know where they are going to find the information they 
need to understand and solve this problem. In their search for inspiration, they tell 
stories.”
Intuition enables us to size up a situation quickly. Mental simulation lets us 
imagine how a course of action might be carried out. Metaphor draws on experi-
ence by suggesting parallels between the current situation and something else we 
have come across. Storytelling helps us consolidate our experiences to make them 
available in the future, either to ourselves or to others. The power of a story is that 
it allows the listener to recreate an experience in his or her mind. Too many de-
tails—too fine a point on things—remove the potency of the listener’s imagination. 
Long before we had computers to run fancy simulation exercises on, we used our 
brains. Long before Disney, we had the Brothers Grimm. Stories are our models for 
thinking and for approaching reality.
What matters about a story is what the listeners do with it, not the smile it 
brings to the face of the teller in its one hundredth reincarnation. Listeners use the 
images evoked to create meaning—meaning that goes on to inform actions. When 
we tell stories and share ‘languaging,’ the changing context can bring us from raw 
experience to the possibilities and limits of shared consciousness.
Stories are among the best tools we have for making sense of our environment 
and getting comfortable with both what has already occurred and with what is yet 
to come. Storytelling is how we make sense. We tell them to ourselves and to each 
other. Without them, we can only exchange words as symbols or icons. If we all had 
precisely the same set of experiences, the mere sharing of words and icons would 
be enough. One word would have but one exact meaning. But we all have divergent 
experiences, and for each of us those experiences are woven together in a multi-
tude of ways.
The good politician, like the good brand marketer, tells stories that evoke a 
response. Something in the story told resonates with the experiences of the listener 
strongly enough to motivate action. But, the key to such a response lies NOT in the 
story or the storyteller—it lies in the listener.
The power of a good story is in the experience it evokes in its listener. Most sto-
ries are set into a context by their tellers. That context reinforces images of place 
and time. By activating the listener’s mental model for a time and place, many 
details need not be told, and the room is created for the listener’s imagination to 
roam. In effect, the storyteller has carved out a canyon and the listener supplies 
the river of meaning to run through it. Each actor coming to the situation has his 
or her own set of representations and compressions, and is forced to react to the 
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assertions of boundaries and indexicals.
It thus is critical to remember that stories are not a collective response—they 
are not told by groups nor heard by groups. Each story has a teller. Each story has a 
set of individual listeners. To attempt to treat narrative and storytelling as the work 
of a collective is to apply yet another potentially fatal over-simplification. Each 
teller is unique. Each listener is unique. Computers may analyze text in a consistent 
manner, where context seemingly does not matter, but humans do not process 
information in that way. We can aggregate the reported labels that listeners and 
tellers may express to a third party, but that aggregate will not inform us about the 
individual experience of either teller or listener. And, it is that individual experi-
ence which matters.
Stories are not a set of labels. If they were, then as the labels were triggered, 
a predefined set of images would be unfolded by the listener. Every listener would 
hear and construct the same story. Children learn that this is not true when they 
play “telephone” or “operator”—the game where one listener repeats the whisper-
ings of one speaker into the ear of another listener, who then whispers what he 
or she has heard into the ear of the next person in line. The children’s game illus-
trates the new things that can emerge as stories are told and retold, a lesson that 
corporate people, however, tend to forget. The corporate chieftains tend to expect 
the same meaning to be evoked by their story as they retell it from audience to 
audience. They thus reduce story to representation. The chieftains miss what the 
children remember—in telling and retelling the same war stories, corporations 
often fail to ask their listeners about the images the story evoked. Listeners use the 
images evoked to create meaning—to build a model/compression which is situated 
around that present context—and that meaning that goes on to inform actions.
What a successful story does is to allow listeners to form a true model in their 
own mind. As noted above, true models are distinct from descriptive representa-
tions in that they explicitly allow for the simulation of change and interventions. 
The successful story will thus allow the listener to form a mental model where the 
possibilities for change can be explored, and where the listener also sees the possi-
bility for implementation or embodiment of that change. Successful stories create 
affordances for personal resonance on the part of the listener. The resonance need 
not be about what the storyteller intends. Affordances are perceived opportunities 
for action—and what the listener perceives, and pays attention to, may be only 
tangentially related to the storyteller’s main point. One of the powerful aspects of 
affordances is that they can be sparked by a cue, a tangent, a metaphor triggered 
inside the listener’s head.
The context set out by the storyteller will conjure up a new set of related ideas 
in the minds of each listener. Meaning emerges from the combination of what the 
storyteller supplies and what the listener’s mind adds. Stories suggest new images, 
combinations of old and new ideas, and allow the listener to place him/herself in 
a simulacrum of related action. Meaningful stories are not made up of isolated 
words—they also must evoke deeply held values and images. To offer up isolated 
words is to evoke a shallow stream of water in a hot desert—whatever value 
there is dries up quickly. The empty articulation of representations in the form of 
jargon—which is itself disconnected from the experiences of those who are forced 
to deal with that articulation—can lead to cognitive dissonance, or worse. 46  The 
proclamation of a label as being indexical can act to offend the self-identity of those 
who adhere to a different description or a different context. In metaphorical terms, 
where the successful storyteller has carved the canyon for the compression to run 
through, the articulator of idle representations has built a canal. . .and the river 
had other ideas. “People do not simply tell stories—they enact them.” 47  
“What is necessary? The answer is, something that preserves plausibility and 
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coherence, something that is reasonable and memorable, something that 
embodies past experience and expectations, something which resonates with 
other people, something that can be constructed retrospectively but also can 
be used prospectively, something that captures both feeling and thought…. In 
short, what is necessary in sense making is a good story.” 48  
“Our ultimate device for dealing with complexity and the other is narrative. 
We use narrative to rise above the local constraints of models. A narrative is 
not about the reality of a situation. Rather, the point of a story is to lay out in 
the open what the narrator suggests is important. Narratives are not about 
being objective, but are instead displays of subjectivity. A narrative is the rep-
resentation of a compression, which is integrated at a higher level of analysis. 
Powerful narratives, like great pieces of music, feel as if they were inevitable 
when they are over, and we seem to agree on that. But note, even in a compel-
ling story, the next line cannot be predicted. It is that feeling of inevitability 
that endows the great story with its ability to generate commensurate experi-
ence amongst independent listeners.” 49 
Narrative can be, and often is, an instrument that provokes active thinking and 
helps us work through problems. Our need for narrative form is perhaps so strong 
that we don’t really believe something is true unless we can see it as a story. 
Bringing a collection of events into narrative coherence can be described as a way 
of normalizing, or naturalizing, those events. It renders them plausible, allowing 
one to see how they all belong. This is a constant theme in the work of historian 
Hayden White: “The very distinction between real and imaginary events, basic to 
modern discussions of both history and fiction, presupposes a notion of reality in 
which ‘the true’ is identified with ‘the real’ only insofar as it can be shown to pos-
sess the character of narrativity.” 50 
How we populate the narrative—characters, problems, context, details—mat-
ters. When the subject matter is in the realm of things or abstract concepts, coherence 
is achieved by minimizing deviance and variation from pre-established definitions 
and categories. But when the subject matter is more in the realm of people, coher-
ence is better understood as a resonance or fit with the listener’s own subjective 
experience. Because simplification tends to take the form of the objective, over-sim-
plification produces its greatest dissonance when labels and categories are applied 
to people-based situations. This is the main take away from Adichie’s TED talk. 51 
Wherever we look, we seek to grasp what we see. Narrative gives us this un-
derstanding. Accordingly, our narrative perception stands ready to be activated in 
order to give us a frame or context for even the most static and uneventful scenes. 
And without understanding the narrative, we often feel we don’t understand what 
we see. We cannot find the meaning. But it is critical to recognize and acknowledge 
that the successful narratives we tell are themselves Black Boxes, and as such, they 
are open and ambiguous to others. To cite Maeda’s tenth law: “Simplicity is about 
subtracting the obvious and adding the meaningful.” 52 
The policemen’s failure with Fook On Sing was to add back the meaningful. 
‘Being a fake’ was not the source of meaning, ‘intended to be burned on a funeral 
pyre’ was. The police lacked the personal stories that allowed them to see past the 
literal. This is what Adichie means by the “Danger of the Single Story.” In design, 
economics, and innovation, that same possibility awaits each of us. When our per-
sonal repertoire of stories lacks the depth or breadth to be appropriate for a given 
situation, that lack needs to be taken as a warning sign. The correct approach is 
seldom to accept the blinders that our personal experience limits us to. Instead, we 
must seek ways to see past the blinders—to find new frames, and to tell new stories.
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Personal stories and models can each function as the equivalent of a repair-
man’s tool belt. Only those problems, which can be addressed by the tools at hand, 
will be noticed, attended to, and dealt with. People who have access to the limited 
perspective of a single tool will see the world in a similarly limited way—if you 
give a child a hammer, all the world is a nail. Multiple perspectives are a means 
of broadening the tool set, allowing for attention to a wider variety of issues and 
demands. We must tell and listen to stories in addition to models. We must focus 
on relationships and contingencies in addition to money and things. We must opt 
for preparedness over prediction.
“It is important that leaders see their role as meaning makers. They must pick 
and choose from the rough materials of reality to construct pictures of great 
possibilities…. In the choice of words, values, and beliefs, you as a leader craft 
reality.” 53  
Implications
Emergence eventually overwhelms whatever complexity reduction—and its focus 
on labels, categories, and simplicity—creates. It is each person’s job to prepare for 
that eventually—to acquire the sagacity that can afford serendipity. The experience 
of emergence demands some form of coherence so that action can occur, and un-
certainty be overcome. Ascribed coherence and retrospective judgments are but a 
temporary salve—dialogue amongst possible narratives, resonance amongst alter-
native homologies, and having the compressions on hand to recognize affordances 
and the context which may create them are the processes required for ongoing 
relief. If creativity and innovation are to thrive, they need to be afforded the de-
grees of freedom in which to thrive. Representations may offer simplicity and effi-
ciency, but they do so at the expense of both fragility and the space of the degrees 
of freedom needed to accommodate emergence and foster creativity.
In their desire to explain things—and thus to understand causality—people 
often construct and interact with narratives built around representations rather 
than compressions. Such narratives work to reduce uncertainty only while the 
participants perceive that the label on which the narrative is based is the best de-
scriptor for the situation they perceive. When best slips to satisficing, and then to 
questioning, the relevance and the resonance of the label-based narrative declines, 
and coherence declines with it. There are alternatives to making use of labels, cate-
gories, and models as the means for establishing coherence and for creating narra-
tives. To address emergence and coherence, people need a better understanding of 
how narratives become good fits to their situation.
Storytelling helps us to consolidate our experiences and make them available 
in the future—to ourselves, and to others. The power of a story is that it allows 
listeners to recreate experience. Too many details or too much exegesis removes 
the potency of the imagination. The power of a good story is in the experience it 
evokes. Most stories are set in a context, which reinforces images of place and time. 
The model of time and place creates order, structure, and recognition—many de-
tails do not need to be told, and room is created for imagination to roam. Meaning 
emerges from the combination of what the storyteller supplies and what the lis-
tener adds—new images, and combinations of old and new ideas. 
Here is the error—there is NO single objective account, and attempts to claim 
that there is by means of an identifying label are over-simplifications. Adichie 
would tell you they are dangerous. Even Ockham of “Ockham’s Razor” fame knew 
this: “The source of many errors in philosophy is the claim that a distinct signified 
thing always corresponds to a distinct word in such a way that there are as many 
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distinct entities being signified as there are distinct names or words doing the sig-
nifying.” 54  As Einstein might phrase the error: “Make things as simple as possible, 
but not simpler.”
Simplicity is a design choice. So too is ambiguity. Simplicity, when imposed 
as a boundary or constraint, can reduce degrees of freedom and increase fragility. 
By contrast, simplicity in the form of a Black Box—which openly self-declares its 
ambiguity, and thereby changes the fundierung relation with its context—increases 
degrees of freedom and introduces resilience. Such simplicity can only work when 
it is composed of a true model, which the others with whom one interacts can find 
resonance in, and which is appropriate to both situation and audience. Only this 
kind of simplicity evokes narratives in those it encounters. With narratives built 
around compressions, affordances are more easily perceived, opportunities are 
better exploited—or at least explored, resonance has a better chance of taking hold, 
and experienced coherence can assert itself in the embrace of emergence.
As promised, this article ends with a heuristic. If your efforts at simplification 
seem as if they are not working, what do you do? You may observe that your discus-
sions, jargon, narratives, et cetera are not resonating with your listeners. You may 
observe that the labels you are using seem to be interpreted differently from your 
intentions by your listeners. You may discover that your understanding of the sit-
uation at hand seems to not explain the very things you believe need explanation. 
At the risk of doing exactly what this article warns about, figure 7 shows a first-cut 
heuristic—but note, like any ‘take-away,’ it is indeed too simple and should be 
regarded as a trigger for further thought, rather than as a defining process. Always 
remember that the ability to intervene and attention to context are both key to 
finding resonance in any explanation. Intervention presumes goals and purposes, 
and they are seldom simple. Attention to context demands attention to nuance, 
subtleties and multiple perspectives. The simple is seldom simple after all—no 
matter how simple a story you try to tell.
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